Incipit Liber Quintus
DIXERAT ORATIONISQUE
CURSUM. — Prosa 1
Sche hadde seyd, and torned the
cours of hir resoun to some
othere thingis to ben treted and to ben ispedd. Thanne seide I,
"Certes ryghtful is thin amonestynge and ful digne by
auctorite. But that thou seydest whilom that the questioun of the
devyne purveaunce is enlaced with many othere questiouns, I
undirstande wel and prove it by the same thing. But I axe yif
that thou wenest that hap be anything in any weys; and yif thou
wenest that hap be anything, what is it?"
Thanne quod sche, "I haste me to yelden and assoilen to
the the dette of my byheste, and to schewen and openen [the] the
wey, by whiche wey thou maist comen ayein to thi contre. But al
be it so that the thingis whiche that thou axest ben ryght
profitable to knowe, yit ben thei divers somwhat fro the path of
my purpos; and it is to douten that thou ne be makid weery by
mysweyes, so that thou ne maist nat suffise to mesuren the ryghte
weie."
"Ne doute the therof nothing," quod I; "for for
to knowen thilke thingis togidre, in the whiche thinges I delite
me gretly — that schal ben to me in stede of reste, syn it
nis nat
to douten of the thingis folwynge, whan every syde of thi
disputesoun schal han ben stedfast to me by undoutous feyth."
"Thanne," seide sche, "that manere wol I don
the," and bygan to speken ryght thus: "Certes," quod
sche, "yif any wyght diffynisse hap in this manere, that is
to seyn that 'hap is bytydynge ibrought forth by
foolisshe moevynge and by no knyttynge of causes,' I
conferme that hap nis ryght naught in no wise; and I deme al
outrely that hap nis [but an idel] voys (as who
seith, but an idel word), withouten any significacioun of
thing summitted to that voys. For what place myght ben left or
duellynge to folie and to disordenaunce, syn that God ledeth and
constreyneth alle thingis by ordre? For this sentence is verray
and soth, that 'no thing hath his beynge of
naught,' to the whiche sentence noon of thise oolde folk
ne withseide nevere; al be it so that they ne undirstoden ne
meneden it nat by God, prince and bygynnere of wirkynge, but thei
casten as a maner foundement of subject material (that is to
seyn, of the nature of alle resouns). And yif that any thing is
woxen or comen of no causes, thanne schal it seme that thilke
thing is comen or woxen of nawght; but yif this ne mai nat ben
don, thanne is it nat possible that hap be any swich thing as I
have difiynysschid a litil herebyforn."
"How schal it thanne be?" quod I. "Nys ther
thanne
nothing that by right may ben clepid other hap or elles aventure
of fortune; or is ther awght, al be it so that it is hidd fro the
peple, to whiche thing thise wordes ben covenable?"
"Myn Aristotle," quod sche, "in the book of his
Phisic diffynysseth this thing by schort resoun, and nyghe to the
sothe."
"In whiche manere?" quod I.
"As ofte," quod sche, "as men don any thing for
grace of any other thing, and another thing
than
thilke thing that men entenden to don bytideth by some causes,
it is clepid hap. Ryght as a man dalf the erthe bycause of
tylyinge of the feld, and founde ther a gobet of gold bydolven;
thanne wenen folk that it is byfalle by fortunous bytydynge. But
forsothe it nis nat of naught, for it hath his propre causes, of
whiche causes the cours unforseyn and unwar semeth to han makid
hap. For yif the tiliere of the feeld ne dulve nat in the erthe,
and yif the hidere of the gold ne hadde hyd the gold in thilke
place, the gold ne hadde nat ben founde. Thise ben thanne the
causes of the abregginge of fortuit hap, the whiche abreggynge
of fortuit hap cometh of causes encontrynge and flowynge togidere
to hemself, and nat by the entencioun of the doere. For neither
the hidere of the gold ne the delvere of the feeld ne undirstoden
nat that the gold sholde han ben founde; but, as I seide, it
bytidde and ran togidre that he dalf thare as that oothir had hid
the gold. Now mai I thus diffinysshen hap: hap is an unwar
betydinge of causes assembled in thingis that ben doon for som
oothir thing; but thilke ordre, procedinge by an uneschuable
byndinge togidre, whiche that descendeth fro the welle of
purveaunce that ordeyneth alle thingis in hir places and in hir
tymes, makith that the causes rennen and assemblen togidre.
RUPIS ACHEMENIE. — Metrum 1
"Tigrys and Eufrates resolven and springen of o welle in
the cragges of the roche of the contre of Achemenye, ther as the
fleinge bataile ficcheth hir dartes retorned in the breestis of
hem that folwen hem. And sone aftir the same ryverys, Tigris and
Eufrates, unjoignen and departen hir watres. And if thei comen
togidre and ben assemblid and clepid togidre into o cours, thanne
moten thilke thingis fleten togidre whiche that the watir of the
entrechaungynge flood bryngeth. The schippes and the stokkes
araced with the flood moten assemblen; and the watris imedled
wrappeth or emplieth many fortunel happes or maneris; the whiche
wandrynge happes natheles thilke enclynynge lowenesse of the
erthe and the flowinge ordre of the slydinge watir governeth.
Right so fortune, that semeth as it fletith with slakid or
ungoverned bridles,it suffreth bridelis (that is to seyn, to ben
governed), and passeth by thilke lawe (that is to seyn, by the
devyne ordenaunce)."
ANIMADVERTO INQUAM. — Prosa 2
"This undirstonde I wel," quod I, "and I accorde
me that it is ryght as thou seist. But I axe yif ther be any
liberte of fre wille in this ordre of causes that clyven thus
togidre in hemself, or elles I wolde witen yif that the destinal
cheyne constrenith the moevynges of the corages of men."
"Yis," quod sche, "ther is liberte of fre wil,
ne
ther ne was nevere no nature of resoun that it ne hadde liberte
of fre wil. For every thing that may naturely usen resoun, it
hath doom by whiche it discernith and demeth every thing; thanne
knoweth it by itself thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that
ben to desiren. And thilke thing that any wight demeth to ben
desired, that axeth or desireth he; and fleeth thilke thing that
he troweth be to fleen. Wherfore in alle thingis that resoun is,
in hem also is liberte of willynge and of nillynge. But I ne
ordeyne nat (as who seith, I ne graunte nat) that this liberte
be evenelyk in alle thinges. Forwhy in the sovereynes devynes
substaunces (that is to seyn, in spiritz) jugement is more cleer,
and wil nat icorrumped, and myght redy to speden thinges that ben
desired. But the soules of men moten nedes he more fre whan thei
loken hem in the speculacioun or lokynge of the devyne thought;
and lasse fre whan thei slyden into the bodyes; and yit lasse fre
whan thei ben gadrid togidre and comprehended in erthli membres;
but the laste servage is whan that thei ben yeven to vices and
han ifalle fro the possessioun of hir propre resoun. For aftir
that thei han cast awey hir eyghen fro the lyght of the sovereyn
sothfastnesse to lowe thingis and derke, anon thei derken by the
cloude of ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talentz;
to the whiche talentz whan thei approchen and
assenten,
thei [helpen] and encrecen the servage whiche thei han joyned to
hemself; and in this manere thei ben caytifs fro hir propre
liberte. The whiche thingis natheles the lokynge of the devyne
purveaunce seth, that alle thingis byholdeth and seeth fro
eterne, and ordeyneth hem everiche in here merites as thei ben
predestinat; and it is seid in Greke that 'alle thinges
he seeth and alle thinges he herith.'
PURO CLARUM LUMINE. — Metrum 2
"Homer with the hony mouth (that is to seyn, Homer with
the swete ditees) singeth that the sonne is cler by pure light;
natheles yit ne mai it nat, by the infirme light of his bemes,
breken or percen the inward entrayles of the erthe or elles of
the see. So ne seth nat God, makere of the grete werld. To hym,
that loketh alle thinges from an hey, ne withstondeth no thinges
by hevynesse of erthe, ne the nyght ne withstondeth nat to hym
by the blake cloudes. Thilke God seeth in o strok of thought alle
thinges that ben, or weren, or schollen comen; and thilke God,
for he loketh and seeth alle thingis alone, thou maist seyn
that he is the verrai sonne."
TUM EGO EN INQUAM. — Prosa 3
Thanne seide I, "Now am I confowndide by a more hard doute
than I was."
"What doute is that?" quod sche, "for certes I
conjecte now by whiche thingis thou art trubled."
"It semeth," quod I, "to repugnen and to
contrarien gretly, that God knoweth byforn alle thinges and that
ther is any fredom of liberte. For yif so be that God loketh alle
thinges byforn, ne God ne mai nat ben desceyved in no manere,
thanne moot it nedes ben that alle thinges betyden the whiche
that the purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn to comen. For whiche,
yif that God knoweth byforn nat oonly the werkes of men, but also
hir conseilles and hir willes, thanne ne schal ther be no liberte
of arbitrie; ne certes ther ne may be noon othir dede, ne no wil,
but thilke whiche that the devyne purveaunce, that ne mai nat ben
disseyved, hath felid byforn. For yif that thei myghten writhen
awey in othere manere than thei ben purveyed, thanne ne sholde
ther be no stedefast prescience of thing to comen, but rather an
uncerteyn opynioun; the whiche thing to trowen of God, I deme it
felonye and unleveful.
"Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun (as who seith, I
ne allowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke same resoun) by whiche
that som men wenen that thei mowe assoilen and unknytten the
knotte of this questioun. For certes thei seyn that thing nis nat
to comen for that the purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn that it
is to comen, but rathir the contrarie; and that is this: that,
for that the thing is to comen, that therfore ne mai it nat ben
hidd fro the purveaunce of God; and in this manere this necessite
slideth ayein into the contrarie partie: ne it ne byhoveth nat
nedes that thinges betiden that ben ipurveied, but it byhoveth
nedes that thinges that ben to comen ben ipurveied — but as
it
were Y travailed (as who seith, that
thilke answere
procedith ryght as though men travaileden or weren besy) to
enqueren the whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing, as
whethir the prescience is cause of the necessite of thinges to
comen, or elles that the necessite of thinges to comen is cause
of the purveaunce. But I ne enforce me nat now to schewen it,
that the bytidynge of thingis iwyst byforn is necessarie, how so
or in what manere that the ordre of causes hath itself; although
that it ne seme naught that the prescience bringe in necessite
of bytydinge to thinges to comen.
"For certes yif that any wyght sitteth, it byhoveth by
necessite that the opynioun be soth of hym that conjecteth that
he sitteth; and ayeinward also is it of the contrarie: yif the
opinioun be soth of any wyght for that he sitteth, it byhoveth
by necessite that he sitte. Thanne is here necessite in the toon
and in the tothir; for in the toon is necessite of syttynge, and
certes in the tothir is necessite of soth. But therfore ne
sitteth nat a wyght for that the opynioun of the sittynge is
soth, but the opinioun is rather soth for that a wyght sitteth
byforn. And thus, althoughe that the cause of the soth cometh of
that other side (as who seith, that
althoughe the
cause of soth cometh of the sittynge, and nat of the trewe
opinioun),
algatis yit is ther comune necessite
in that oon and in that othir. Thus scheweth it that Y may make
semblable skiles of the purveaunce of God and of thingis to
comen. For althoughe that for that thingis ben to comen therfore
ben thei purveied, and nat certes for thei be purveied therfore
ne bytide thei nat; yit natheles byhoveth it by necessite that
eyther the thinges to comen ben ipurveied of God, or elles that
the thinges that ben ipurveyed of God betyden. And this thing
oonly suffiseth inow to destroien the fredom of oure arbitre
(that is to seyn, of our fre wil).
"But certes now schewith it wel how fer fro the sothe
and
how up-so-doun is this thing that we seyn, that the betydynge of
temporel thingis is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to
wenen that God purveieth the thinges to comen for thei ben to
comen — what oothir thing is it but for to wene that thilke
thinges that bytidden whilom ben cause of thilke soverein
purveaunce that is in God? And herto I adde yit this thing: that
ryght as whanne that I woot that a thing is, it byhoveth by
necessite that thilke selve thing be; and eek whan I have knowen
that any thing schal betyden; so byhovith it by necessite that
thilke same thing betide; so folweth it thanne that the betydynge
of the thing iwyste byforn ne may nat ben eschued. And at the
laste, yif that any wyght wene a thing to ben oothir weyes than
it is, it nis nat oonly unscience, but it is desceyvable opynioun
ful divers and fer fro the sothe of science. Wherfore, yif any
thing be so to comen that the betidynge of it ne be nat certein
ne necessarie, who mai witen byforn that thilke thing is to
comen? For ryght as science ne may nat ben medled with falsnesse
(as who seith, that yif I woot a thing,
it ne mai
nat ben fals that I ne woot it), ryght so thilke thing that
is conceyved by science ne may nat ben noon other weies than as
it is conceyved. For that is the cause why that science wanteth
lesynge (as who seith, why that wytynge
ne
resceyveth nat lesynge of that it woot); for it byhoveth by
necessite that every thing he ryght as science comprehendeth it
to be.
"What schal I thanne seyn? In whiche manere knoweth God
byforn the thinges to comen, yif thei ne ben nat certein? For yif
that he deme that thei ben to comen uneschewably, and so may be
that it is possible that thei ne schollen nat comen, God is
disseyved. But not oonly to trowe that God is disseyved, but for
to speke it with mouthe, it is a felonous synne. But yif that God
woot that ryght so as thinges ben to comen, so schollen they
comen, so that he wite egaly (as who
seith,
indifferently) that thingis mowen ben doon or elles nat
idoon, what is thilke prescience that ne comprehendeth no certein
thing ne stable? Or elles what difference is ther bytwixe the
prescience and thilke japeworthi devynynge of Tyresie the
divynour, that seide, 'Al that I seie,' quod
he, 'either it schal be or elles it ne schal nat
be?' Or elles how mochel is worth the devyne prescience
more than the opinioun of mankynde, yif so be that it demeth the
thinges uncertayn, as men doon, of the whiche domes of men the
betydinge nis nat certein? But yif so be that noon uncertein
thing ne mai ben in hym that is right certeyn welle of alle
thingis, than is the betydinge certein of thilke thingis whiche
he hath wist byforn fermely to comen. For whiche it folweth that
the fredom of the conseiles and of the werkis of mankynde nis
noon, syn that the thought of God, that seeth alle thinges
withouten errour of falsnesse, byndeth and constreyneth hem to
[o] bytidynge by necessite.
"And yif this thing be oonys igrauntid and resceyved
(that is to seyn, that ther nis no fre
wil), thanne
scheweth it wel how gret destruccioun and how gret damages ther
folwen of thingis of mankynde. For in idel ben ther thanne
purposed and byhyght medes to good folk, and peynes to badde
folk, syn that no moevynge of fre corage [and] voluntarie ne hath
nat disservid hem (that is to seyn,
neither mede ne
peyne). And it scholde seme thanne that thilke thing is
alther-worst whiche that is now demed for alther-moost just and
moost ryghtful, that is to seyn that schrewes ben punysschid or
elles that good folk ben igerdoned, the whiche folk syn that hir
propre wil ne sent hem nat to the toon ne to that othir
(that is to seyn, neither to good ne to harm), but
constreyneth hem certein necessite of thingis to comen. Thanne
ne schulle ther nevere be, ne nevere were, vice ne vertu, but it
scholde rather ben confusion of alle dissertes medlid withouten
discrecioun. And yit ther folweth anothir inconvenient, of the
whiche ther ne mai be thought no more felonous ne more wikke, and
that is this: that, so as the ordre of thingis is iled and cometh
of the purveaunce of God, ne that nothing is leveful to the
conseiles of mankynde (as who seith that men han no power to don
nothing ne wilne nothing), thanne folweth it that oure vices ben
referrid to the makere of alle good (as
who seith,
thanne folweth it that God oughte han the blame of our
vices), syn he constreyneth us by necessite to doon vices.
"Than nis ther no resoun to han hope in God, ne for to
preien to God. For what scholde any wyght hopen to God, or why
scholde he preien to God, syn that the ordenance of destyne
whiche that mai nat ben enclyned knytteth and streyneth alle
thingis that men mai desiren? Thanne scholde ther be don awey
thilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen God and men (that is to seyn, to
hopen and to preien). But by the pris of ryghtwisnesse and of
verray mekenesse we disserven the gerdon of the devyne grace
whiche that is inestimable (that is to seyn, that it is so greet
that it ne mai nat ben ful ipreysed). And this is oonly the
manere (that is to seyn, hope and preieris) for whiche it semeth
that men mowen spekyn with God, and by resoun of supplicacion be
conjoyned to thilke cleernesse that nis nat aprochid no rather
or that men byseken it and impetren it. And yif men ne wene nat
that hope ne preieris ne han no strengthis by the necessite of
thingis to comen iresceyved, what thing is ther thanne by whiche
we mowen ben conjoyned and clyven to thilke sovereyne prince of
thingis? For whiche it byhoveth by necessite that the lynage of
mankynde, as thou songe a litil herebyforn, be departed and
unjoyned from his welle, and failen of his bygynnynge (that is
to seyn, God).
QUENAM DISCORS. — Metrum 3
"What discordable cause hath torent and unjoyned the
byndynge or the alliaunce of thingis (that is to seyn, the
conjunccions of God and of man)? Whiche god hath establisschid
so gret bataile bytwixen these two sothfast or verreie thinges
(that is to seyn, bytwyxen the purveaunce of God and fre wil)
that thei ben singuler and dyvided, ne that they ne wole nat ben
medled ne couplid togidre? But ther nis no discord to the verray
thinges, but thei clyven alwey certein to hemself; but the
thought of man, confownded and overthrowen by the derke membres
of the body, ne mai nat be fyr of his derked lookynge
(that is to seyn, by the vigour of his
insyghte while
the soule is in the body) knowen the thynne sutile
knyttynges of thinges. But wherfore eschaufeth it so by so gret
love to fynden thilke notes of soth icovered? (That
is to seyn, wherfore eschaufeth the thought of man by so gret
desir to knowen thilke notificaciouns that ben ihid undir the
covertures of soth?) Woot it aught thilke thing that it
angwisshous desireth to knowe? (As who
seith,
nay; for no man ne travaileth for to witen thingis that he wot.
And therfore the texte seith thus:) But who travaileth to
wite thingis iknowe? And yif that he ne knoweth hem nat, what
sekith thilke blynde thoght? What is he that desireth any thyng
of which he wot right naught? (As who
seith, whoso
desireth any thing, nedes somwhat he knoweth of it, or elles he
ne coude nat desiren it.) Or who may folwen thinges that ne
ben nat iwist? And thoughe that he seke tho thingis, wher schal
he fynde hem? What wyght that is al unkunnynge and ignoraunt may
knowe the forme that is ifounde? But whanne the soule byholdeth
and seeth the heye thought (that is to seyn, God), thanne knoweth
it togidre the somme and the singularites (that is
to seyn, the principles and everyche by hymself)? But now,
while the soule is hidd in the cloude and in the derknesse of the
membres of the body, it ne hath nat al foryeten itself, but it
withholdeth the somme of thinges and lesith the singularites.
Thanne who so that sekith sothnesse, he nis in neyther nother
habite, for he
not nat al, ne he ne hath nat al
foryeten; but yit hym remembreth the somme of thinges that he
withholdeth, and axeth conseile, and retretith deepliche thinges
iseyn byforne (that is to seyn, the grete
somme in
his mynde) so that he mowe adden the parties that be hath
foryeten to thilke that he hath withholden."
TUM ILLA VETUS INQUIT HEC EST. — Prosa
4
Than seide sche, "This is," quod sche, "the olde
questioun of the purveaunce of God. And Marcus Tullius, whan he
devyded the divynaciouns (that is to
seyn, in his
book that he wrot of dyvynaciouns), he moevede gretly this
questioun; and thou thiself hast ysought it mochel and outrely
and longe. But yit ne hath it nat ben determined ne isped fermely
and diligently of any of yow. And the cause of this dirknesse and
of this difficulte is, for that the moevynge of the resoun of
mankynde ne may nat moeven to (that is to
seyn,
applien or joignen to) the simplicite of the devyne
prescience; the whiche symplicite of the devyne prescience, yif
that men myghte thinken it in any manere (that is to seyn, that
yif men myghten thinken and comprehenden the thinges as God seeth
hem), thanne ne scholde ther duelle outrely no doute. The whiche
resoun and cause of difficulte I schal assaye at the laste to
schewe and to speden, whan I have first ispendid and answerd to
the resouns by whiche thou art ymoeved.
"For I axe whi thou wenest that thilke [resoun] of hem
that assoilen this questioun ne be nat speedful inow ne
sufficient; the whiche solucioun, or the whiche resoun, for that
it demeth that the prescience nis nat cause of necessite to
thinges to comen, than ne weneth it nat that fredom of wil be
distorbed or ylet he prescience. For ne drawestow nat argumentz
fro elleswhere of the necessite of thingis to comen
(as who seith, any oothir wey than
thus) but that
thilke thinges that the prescience woot byforn ne mowen nat
unbetyde (that is to seyn, that thei
moten
betide)? But thanne, yif that prescience ne putteth no
necessite to thingis to comen, as thou thiself bast confessed it
and byknowen a litel herebyforn, what cause or what is it
(as who seith, ther may no cause
be) by whiche that
the endes voluntarie of thinges myghten be constreyned to certein
bytydynge? For by grace of posicioun, so that thou mowe the
betere undirstonde this that folweth, I pose that ther ne be no
prescience. Thanne axe I," quod sche, "in as moche as
aperteneth to that, scholden thanne thingis that comen of fre wil
ben constreyned to bytiden by necessite?"
Boecius. "Nay," quod
I.
"Thanne ayeinward," quod sche, "I suppose that
ther be prescience, but that it ne putteth no necessite to
thingis; thanne trowe I that thilke selve fredom of wil schal
duellen al hool and absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt seyn
that, al be it so that prescience nis nat cause of the necessite
of bytydynge to thingis to comen, algatis yit it is a signe that
the thingis ben to bytyden by necessite. By this manere thanne,
althoughe the prescience ne hadde nevere iben, yit algate, or at
the leste wey, it is certein thing that the endes and bytydinges
of thingis to comen scholden ben necessarie. For every signe
scheweth and signifieth oonly what the thing is, but it ne makith
nat the thing that it signifieth. For whiche it byhoveth first
to schewen that nothing ne bytideth that it ne betideth by
necessite, so that it mai apiere that the prescience is signe of
this necessite; or elles, yif ther nere no necessite, certes
thilke prescience ne myghte nat ben signe of thing that nis nat.
But certes, it is now certein that the proeve of this, isusteyned
by stedfast resoun, ne schal nat ben lad ne proeved by signes,
ne by argumentz itaken fro withoute, but by causes covenable and
necessarie.
"But thou mayst seyn, 'How may it be that the
thingis ne betyden nat that ben ipurveied to comen? But certes,
ryght as we [troweden] that tho thingis whiche that the
purveaunce woot byforn to comen, ne ben nat to bytiden!'
But that ne scholde we nat demen; but rathir, althoughe that thei
schal betyden, yit ne have thei no necessite of hir kynde to
betyden. And this maystow lyghtly aperceyven by this that I schal
seyn. For we seen many thingis whan
thei ben done
byforn oure eyen, ryght as men seen the cartere worken in the
tornynge and in atemprynge or adressynge of hise cartes or
chariottes, and by this manere (as who seith, maistow
undirstonden) of alle othere werkmen. Is ther thanne any
necessite (as who seith, in our lookynge) that constreynith or
compelleth any of thilke thingis to ben don so?"
Boece. "Nay,"
quod I, "for in
idel and in veyn were al the effect of craft, yif that alle
thingis weren moeved by constreynynge (that is to seyn, by
constreinynge of our eyen or of our sighte)."
Philosophie. "The
thingis thanne,"
quod she, "that, whan men doon hem, ne han no necessite that
men doon hem, eek tho same thingis, first or thei ben don, thei
ben to comen withoute necessite. Forwhy ther ben some thingis to
betyden, of whiche the eendes and the bytydynges of hem ben
absolut and quit of alle necessite. For certes I ne trowe nat
that any man wolde seyn this: that tho thingis that men don now,
that thei ne weren to bytiden first or thei weren idoon; and
thilke same thinges, althoughe that men hadden iwyst hem byforn,
yit thei han fre bytydynges. For ryght as science of thingis
present ne bryngith in no necessite to thingis that men doon,
right so the prescience of thinges to comen ne bryngith in no
necessite to thinges to bytiden.
"But thou maist seyn that of thilke same it is idouted,
as whethir that of thilke thingis that ne han noon issues and
bytidynges necessaries, yif therof mai ben any prescience. For
certes thei semen to discorden, for thou wenest that yif that
thingis ben iseyn byfore, that necessite folwith hem; and yif
necessite faileth hem, thei ne myghten nat ben wist byforn; and
that nothing may be comprehended by science but certein. And yif
tho thinges that ne han no certein bytydingis ben ipurveied as
certein, it scholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat sothfastnesse
of science. And thou wenest that it be dyvers fro the holnesse
of science that any man scholde deme a thing to ben otherwyse
than it is itself.
"And the cause of this errour is that of alle the
thingis
that every wyght hath iknowe, thei wenen that tho thingis ben
iknowe al only by the strengthe and by the nature of the thinges
that
ben iwyst or iknowe. And it is al the contrarye; for al that
evere is iknowe, it is rather comprehendid and knowen, nat aftir
his strengthe and his nature, but aftir the faculte (that is to
seyn, the power and the nature) of hem that knowen. And, for that
this schal mowen schewen by a schort ensaumple, the same
rowndnesse of a body, otherweys the sighte of the eighe knoweth
it, and otherweys the touchynge. The lookynge, by castynge of his
bemys, waiteth and seeth fro afer al the body togidre, withoute
moevynge of itself; but the touchynge clyveth and conjoyneth to
the rounde body, and moeveth aboute the envyrounynge, and
comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse. And the man hymself,
ootherweys wit byholdeth hym, and ootherweys ymaginacioun, and
otherweyes resoun, and ootherweies intelligence. For the wit
comprehendith withoute-forth the figure of the body of the man
that is establisschid in the matere subgett; but the ymaginacioun
comprehendith oonly the figure withoute the matere; resoun
surmountith ymaginacioun and comprehendith by an universel
lokynge the comune spece that is in the singuler peces. But the
eighe of intelligence is heyere, for it surmountith the
envyrounynge of the universite, and loketh over that bi pure
subtilte of thought thilke same symple forme of man that is
perdurablely in the devyne thought. In whiche this oughte gretly
to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden
thinges enbraseth and contienith the lowere strengthe; but the
lower strengthe ne ariseth nat in no manere to the heyere
strengthe. For wit ne mai no thing comprehende out of matere ne
the ymaginacioun ne loketh nat the universel speces, ne resoun
ne taketh nat the symple forme so as intelligence takith it; but
intelligence, that lookith [as] aboven, whanne it hath
comprehended the forme, it knowith and demyth alle the thinges
that ben undir that foorme; but sche knoweth hem in thilke manere
in the whiche it comprehendith thilke same symple forme that ne
may
nevere ben knowen to noon of that othere (that
is to seyn, to none of tho thre forseyde strengthis of the
soule). For it knoweth the universite of resoun, and the figure
of ymaginacioun, and the sensible material conceyved by wit; ne
it ne useth nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne of wit
withoute-forth; but it byholdeth alle thingis, so as I schal
seie, by [o] strook of thought formely (withoute
discours or collacioun). Certes resoun, whan it lokith any
thing universel, it ne useth nat of ymaginacioun, nor of wit; and
algatis yit it comprehendith the thingis ymaginable and sensible.
For reson is she that diffynyscheth the universel of here
conceyte ryght thus: man is a resonable two-foted beest. And how
so that this knowynge is universel, yit nis ther no wyght that
ne wot wel that a man is a thing ymaginable and sensible; and
this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by
ymaginacioun nor by wit, but it lookith it by resonable
concepcioun. Also ymaginacioun, albeit so that it takith of wit
the bygynnynges to seen and to formen the figures, algates
althoughe that wit ne were nat present, yit it envyrowneth and
comprehendith alle thingis sensible, nat by resoun sensible of
demynge, but by resoun ymaginatyf. Seestow nat thanne that alle
the thingis in knowynge usen more of hir faculte or of hir power
than thei don of the faculte or power of thingis that ben iknowe?
Ne that nis nat wrong; for so as every jugement is the dede or
the doyng of hym that demeth, it byhoveth that every wyght
performe the werk and his entencioun, nat of foreyne power, but
of his propre power.
QUONDAM PORTICUS ATTULIT. — Metrum 4
"The porche (that is to seyn, a gate of the toun of
Athenis there as philosophris hadden hir congregacioun to
desputen) — thilke porche broughte somtyme olde men, ful
dirke in
hir sentences (that is to seyn,
philosophris that
hyghten Stoycienis), that wenden that ymages and
sensibilities (that is to seyn, sensible
ymaginaciouns or ellis ymaginaciouns of sensible thingis)
weren enprientid into soules fro bodyes withoute-forth
(as who seith that thilke Stoycienis
wenden that the
sowle had ben nakid of itself as a mirour or a clene parchemyn,
so that alle figures most first comen fro thinges fro withoute
into soules, and ben emprientid into soules);
(Textus) ryght as we ben wont
somtyme by a swift
poyntel to fycchen lettres emprientid in the smothnesse or in the
pleynesse of the table of wex or in parchemyn that ne hath no
figure ne note in it. (Glose. But now
argueth Boece
ayens that opynioun and seith thus:) But yif the thryvynge
soule ne unpliteth nothing (that is to seyn, ne doth nothing) by
his propre moevynges, but suffrith and lith subgit to the figures
and to the notes of bodies withoute-forth, and yeldith ymages
ydel and vein in the manere of a mirour, whennes thryveth thanne
or whennes comith thilke knowynge in our soule, that discernith
and byholdith alle thinges? And whennes is thilke strengthe that
byholdeth the singuler thinges? Or whennes is the strengthe that
devydeth thinges iknowe; and thilke strengthe that gadreth
togidre the thingis devyded; and the strengthe that chesith his
entrechaunged wey? For somtyme it hevyth up the heved
(that is to seyn, that it hevyth up the
entencioun)
to ryght heye thinges, and somtyme it descendith into ryght lowe
thinges; and whan it retorneth into hymself it reproveth and
destroyeth the false thingis by the trewe thinges. Certes this
strengthe is cause more efficient, and mochel more myghty to seen
and to knowe thinges, than thilke cause that suffrith and
resceyveth the notes and the figures empressid in manere of
matere. Algatis the passion (that is to seyn, the suffraunce or
the wit) in the quyke body goth byforn, excitynge and moevynge
the strengthes of the thought, ryght so as whan that cleernesse
smyteth the eyen and moeveth hem to seen, or ryght so as voys or
soun hurteleth to the eres and commoeveth hem to herkne; than is
the strengthe of the thought imoevid and excited, and clepith
forth to semblable moevyngis the
speces that it halt
withynne itself, and addith tho speces to the notes and to the
thinges withoute-forth, and medleth the ymagis of thinges
withoute-forth to the foormes ihidd withynne hymself.
QUOD SI IN CORPORIBUS SENCIENDIS. — Prosa
5
"But what yif that in bodyes to ben feled
(that is to seyn, in the takynge of
knowlechynge of
bodily thinges), and albeit so that the qualites of bodies
that ben object fro withoute-forth moeven and entalenten the
instrumentz of the wittes, and albeit so that the passioun of the
body (that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce) goth toforn the
strengthe of the wirkynge corage, the whiche passioun or
sufraunce clepith forth the dede of the thought in hymself and
moeveth and exciteth in this menewhile the formes that resten
within-forth, and yif that in sensible bodies, as I have seid,
our corage nis nat ytaught or empriented by passioun to knowe
thise thinges, but demeth and knoweth of his owne strengthe the
passioun or suffrance subject to the body — moche more than
tho
thingis that ben absolut and quit fro alle talentz or affecciouns
of bodyes (as God or his aungelis) ne folwen nat in discernynge
thinges object fro withoute-forth, but thei acomplissen and
speden the dede of hir thought. By this resoun, thanne, ther
comen many maner knowynges to dyverse and differynge substaunces.
For the wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and despoiled
of alle oothre knowynges — thilke wit cometh to beestis that
ne
mowen nat moeven hemself her and ther, as oistres and muscles and
oothir swich schelle-fyssche of the see that clyven and ben
norisschid to roches. But the ymaginacioun cometh to remuable
bestis, that semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren any
thing. But resoun is al oonly to the lynage of mankynde, ryght
as intelligence is oonly the devyne nature. Of whiche it folweth
that thilke knowynge is more worth than thise oothre, syn it
knoweth by his propre nature nat oonly his subget (as who seith,
it ne knoweth nat al oonly that apertenith properly to his
knowinge) but it knoweth the subjectz of alle othre knowynges.
"But how schal it thanne be, yif that wit and
ymaginacioun
stryven ayein resonynge and seyn that, of thilke universel
thingis that resoun weneth to seen, that it nis ryght naught? For
wit and ymaginacioun seyn that that that is sensible or
ymaginable, it ne mai nat ben universel; thanne is either the
jugement of resoun soth, ne that ther nis no thing sensible; or
elles, for that resoun woot wel that many thinges ben subject to
wit and to ymaginacioun, thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn
and fals, whiche that lokith and comprehendith that that is
sensible and singuler as universel. And yif that resoun wolde
answere ayein to thise two (that is to
seyn, to wit
and to ymaginacioun), and seyn that sothly sche hirselve
(that is to seyn, resoun) lokith
and comprehendith,
by resoun of universalite, bothe that that is sensible and that
that is ymaginable; and that thilke two (that is to seyn, wit and
ymaginacioun) ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhaunsen hemself to
knowynge of universalite, for that the knowynge of hem ne mai
exceden ne surmounten the bodily figures: certes of the knowynge
of thinges, men oughten rather yeven credence to the more
stidfast and to the mor parfit jugement; in this manere
stryvynge, thanne, we that han strengthe of resonynge and of
ymagynynge and of wit (that is to seyn, by resoun and by
imagynacioun and by wit), we scholde rathir preise the cause of
resoun (as who seith, than the cause of
wit and of
ymaginacioun).
"Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of mankynde ne
weneth nat that the devyne intelligence byholdeth or knoweth
thingis to comen, but ryght as the resoun of mankynde knoweth hem.
For thou
arguist and seist thus: that if it ne seme nat to men that some
thingis han certeyn and necessarie bytydynges, thei ne mowen nat
ben wist byforn certeinly to betyden, and thanne nis ther no
prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that prescience
be in thise thingis, thanne is ther nothing that it ne bytydeth
by necessite. But certes yif we myghten han the jugement of the
devyne thoght, as we ben parsoners of
resoun, ryght
so as we han demyd that it byhovith that ymaginacioun and wit ben
bynethe resoun, ryght so wolde we demen that it were ryghtfull
thing that mannys resoun oughte to summytten itself and to ben
bynethe the devyne thought. For whiche yif that we mowen
(as who seith that, if that we mowen, I
conseile
that) we enhaunse us into the heighte of thilke soverein
intelligence; for ther schal resoun wel seen that that it ne mai
nat byholden in itself, and certes that is this: in what manere
the prescience of God seeth alle thinges certeins and
diffinyssched, althoughe thei ne han no certein issues or
bytydyngis; ne this nis noon opinioun, but it is rather the
simplicite of the soverein science, that nis nat enclosed nor
ischet withinne none boundes.
QUAM VARIIS TERRAS. — Metrum 5
"The beestes passen by the erthes be ful diverse figures.
For some of hem han hir bodyes straught, and crepyn in the dust,
and drawen aftir hem a traas or a furwe icontynued (that is to
sein, as naddres or snakes); and oothre beestis by the wandrynge
lyghtnesse of hir wynges beten the wyndes, and overswymmen the
spaces of the longe eir by moyst fleynge; and oothere beestes
gladen hemself to diggen hir traas or hir steppys in the erthe
with hir goinges or with hir feet, and to gon either by the grene
feeldes or elles to walken undir the wodes. And al be it so that
thou seest that thei alle discorden by diverse foormes, algatis
hir faces enclyned hevyeth hir dulle wittes. Only the lynage of
man heveth heyest his heie heved, and stondith light with his
upryght body, and byholdeth the erthes undir hym. And, but yif
thou, erthly man, waxest yvel out of thi wit, this figure
amonesteth the, that axest the hevene with thi ryghte visage and
hast areised thi forhheved, to beren up an hye thi corage, so
that thi thought ne be nat ihevyed ne put lowe undir fote, syn
that thi body is so heyghe areysed.
QUONlAM IGITUR UTI PAULO ANTE. — Prosa
6
"Therfore thanne, as I have schewed a litel herebyforne
that alle thing that is iwist nis nat knowen by his nature
propre, but by the nature of hem that comprehenden it, lat us
loke now, in as mochil as it is leveful to us (as who seith, lat
us loke now as we mowen) whiche that the estat is of the devyne
substaunce; so that we mowe eek knowen what his science is. The
comune jugement of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that
God is eterne. Lat us considere thanne what is eternite; for
certes that schal schewen us togidre the devyne nature and the
devyne science. Eternite, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al
togidre
of lif interminable; and that schewethe more cleerly by the
comparysoun or collacioun of temporel thinges. For alle thing
that lyveth in tyme, it is present and procedith fro preteritz
into futures (that is to seyn, fro tyme passed into tyme
comynge), ne ther nis nothing establisshed in tyme that mai
enbrasen togidre al the space of his lif. For certis yit ne hath
it nat taken the tyme of tomorwe, and it hath lost that of
yusterday, and certes in the lif of this dai ye ne lyve namore
but right as in this moevable and transitorie moment. Thanne
thilke thing that suffreth temporel condicioun, althoughe that
it nevere bygan to be, ne thoughe it nevere ne cese for to be,
as Aristotile deemed of the world, and althoughe that the lif of
it be strecchid with infinite of tyme; yit algatis nis it no
swich thing that men mighten trowen by ryght that it is eterne.
For althouhe that it comprehende and embrase the space of lif
infinit, yit algatis ne enbraseth it nat the space of the lif al
togidre; for it ne hath nat the futuris (that ne ben
nat yit), ne it ne hath no lengere the preteritz
(that ben idoon or ipassed). But
thilke thing,
thanne, that hath and comprehendith togidre al the plente of the
lif interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of the future,
and to whom ther nis noght of the preteryt escaped nor ipassed,
thilke same is iwitnessed and iproevid by right to ben eterne;
and it byhovith by necessite that thilke thing he alwey present
to hymself and compotent (as who seith, alwey present to hymselve
and so myghty that al be right at his plesaunce), and that he
have al present the infinit of the moevable tyme.
"Wherfore som men trowen wrongfully that, whan thei
heren
that it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde nevere
bygynnynge of tyme, ne that it nevere schal han failynge, thei
wenen in this manere that this world be makid coeterne
with his makere. (As who seith, thei wene
that this
world and God ben makid togidre eterne, and that is a wrongful
wenynge.) For other thing is it to ben ilad by lif
interminable, as Plato grauntide to the world, and oothir is it
to enbrace togidre al the presence of the lif intermynable, the
whiche thing it is cleer and manyfest that it is propre to the
devyne thought. Ne it ne scholde nat semen to us that God is
eldere than thinges that ben imaked by quantite of tyme, but
rathir by the proprete of his simple nature. For this ilke
infinit moevyng of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie
estat of the lif inmoevable; and, so as it ne mai nat contrefetin
it ne feynen it, ne be evene lik to it, [fro] the immoevablete
(that is to sein, that is in the eternite of God) it faileth and
fallith into moevynge, [and] fro the simplicite of the presence
of [God] disencresith into the infinit quantite of future and of
preterit; and so as it ne mai nat han togidre al the plente of
the lif, algates yit, for as moche as it ne ceseth nevere for to
ben in som manere, it semyth somdel to us that it folwith and
resembleth thilke thing that it ne mai nat atayne to ne
fulfillen, and byndeth itself to som maner presence of this litle
and swift moment, the whiche presence of this litle and swifte
moment, for that it bereth a maner ymage or liknesse of the ai
duellynge presence of God, it grauntith to swich manere thinges
as it betydith to that it semeth hem that thise thinges han iben
and ben. And for that the presence of swiche litil moment ne mai
nat duelle, therfore it ravysschide and took the infynit wey of
tyme (that is to seyn, by
successioun). And by
this manere is it idoon for that it sholde contynue the lif in
goinge, of the whiche lif it ne myght nat enbrace the plente in
duellinge. And forthi yif we wollen putten worthi names to
thinges and folwen Plato, lat us seyen thanne sothly that God is
'eterne,' and that the world is
'perpetuel.'
"Thanne, syn that every jugement knoweth and
comprehendith
by his owne nature thinges that ben subgect unto hym, ther is
sothly to God alweys an eterne and presentarie estat; and the
science of hym, that overpasseth alle temporel moevement,
duelleth in the simplicite of his presence, and embraceth and
considerith alle the infynit spaces of tymes preteritz and
futures, and lokith in his simple knowynge alle thinges of
preterit ryght as thei weren idoon presently ryght now. Yif thou
wolt thanne thinken and avise the prescience by whiche it knoweth
alle thinges, thou ne schalt naught demen it as prescience of
thinges to comen, but thou schalt demen more ryghtfully that it
is science of presence or of instaunce that nevere ne faileth.
For whiche it nis nat ycleped 'previdence,' but
it sholde rathir ben clepid 'purveaunce,' that
is establisshed ful fer fro ryght lowe thinges, and byholdeth fro
afer alle thingis, right as it were fro the heye heighte of
thinges.
"Why axestow thanne, or whi desputestow thanne, that
thilke thingis ben doon by necessite whiche that ben yseyn and
knowen by the devyne sighte, syn that forsothe men ne maken nat
thilke thinges necessarie whiche that thei seen ben idoon in hir
sighte? For addith thi byholdynge any necessite to thilke thinges
that thou byholdest present?"
"Nay," quod I.
Philosophie. "Certes,
thanne, yif men
myghte maken any digne comparysoun or collacioun of the presence
devyne and of the presence of mankynde, ryght so as ye seen some
thinges in this temporel present, ryght so seeth God alle thinges
by his eterne present.
"Wherfore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the
nature ne the proprete of thinges, but byholdeth swiche thingis
present to hym-ward as thei shollen betyde to yow-ward in tyme
to comen. Ne it ne confowndeth nat the jugementz of thingis; but
by o sight of his thought he knoweth the thinges to comen, as wel
necessarie as nat necessarie. Ryght so as whan ye seen togidre
a man walke on the erthe and the sonne arisen in the hevene,
albeit so that ye seen and byholden the ton and the tothir
togidre, yit natheles ye demen and discerne that the toon is
voluntarie and the tothir is necessarie. Ryght so thanne the
devyne lookynge, byholdynge alle thinges undir hym, ne trowbleth
nat the qualite of thinges that ben certeinly present to hym-ward
but, as to the condicioun of tyme,
forsothe thei ben
futur. For which it folwith that this nis noon opynioun, but
rathir a stidfast knowynge istrengthid by soothnesse that, whan
that God knoweth any thing to be, he ne unwot not that thilke
thing wantith necessite to be. (This is to sein that whan that
God knoweth any thing to betide, be wot wel that it ne hath no
necessite to betyde.)
"And yif thou seist here that thilke thing that God
seeth
to betide, it ne may nat unbytide (as who
seith, it
moot bytide), and thilke thing that ne mai nat unbytide, it
mot bytiden by necessite, and that thou streyne me to this name
of necessite, certes I wol wel confessen and byknowen a thing of
ful sad trouthe. But unnethe schal ther any wight mowe seen it
or come therto, but yif that he be byhold of the devyne thought.
For I wol answeren the thus: that thilke thing that is futur,
whan it is referred to the devyne knowynge, than is it
necessarie; but certis whan it is undirstonden in his owene
kynde, men seen it outrely fre and absolut fro alle necessite.
"For certes ther ben two maneris of necessites: that oon
necessite is symple, as thus: that it byhovith by necessite that
alle men ben mortal or dedly; anothir necessite is condicionel,
as thus: yif thow wost that a man walketh, it byhovith by
necessite that he walke. Thilke thing, thanne, that any wight
hath iknowe to be, it ne mai ben noon oothir weys thanne be
knowith it to he. But this condicion ne draweth nat with hir
thilke necessite simple; for certes this necessite condicionel
—
the propre nature of it ne makith it nat, but the adjeccioun of
the condicioun makith it. For no necessite ne constreyneth a man
to gon that goth by his propre wil, al be it so that whan he goth
that it is necessarie that be goth. Ryght on this same man
thanne, yf that the purveaunce of God seeth any thyng present,
than moot thilke thing ben by necessite, althoghe that it ne have
no necessite of his owne nature. But certes the futures that
bytiden by fredom of arbitrie, God seth hem alle togidre
presentz. Thise thinges thanne, yif thei ben referrid to the
devyne sighte, than ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun
of the devyne knowynge. But certes yif thilke thingis ben
considered by hemself, thei ben absolut of necessite, and ne
forleten nat ne cesen nat of the liberte of hir owne nature.
Thanne certes withoute doute alle the thinges shollen ben
doon whiche that God woot byforn that thei ben to comen. But some
of hem comen and bytiden of fre arbitrie or of fre wil, that, al
be it so that thei bytiden, yit algates ne lese thei nat hir
propre nature in beinge, by the whiche, first or that thei weren
idon, thei hadden power noght to han bytyd."
Boece. "What is
this to seyn
thanne," quod I, "that thinges ne ben nat necessarie by
hir propre nature, so as thei comen in alle maneris in the
liknesse of necessite by the condicioun of the devyne
science?"
Philosophie. "This is the
difference," quod sche, "that tho thinges that I
purposide the a litil herbyforn — that is to seyn, the sonne
arysynge and the man walkynge — that ther-whiles that thilke
thinges ben idoon, they ne myghte nat ben undoon; natheles that
oon of hem, or it was idoon, it byhovide by necessite that it was
idoon, but nat that oothir. Ryght so is it here, that the thinges
that God hath present, withoute doute thei shollen ben. But some
of hem descendith of the nature of thinges (as the sonne
arysynge); and some descendith of the power of the doeris (as the
man walkynge). Thanne seide I no wrong that, yif that thise
thinges ben referred to the devyne knowynge, thanne ben thei
necessarie; and yif thei ben considered by hemself, than ben thei
absolut fro the boond of necessite. Right so as alle thingis that
apiereth or scheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre it to
resoun, it is universel; and yif thou loke it or referre it to
itself, than is it singuler.
"But now yif thou seist thus: that, 'If it be in
my power to chaunge my purpos, than schal I voiden the purveaunce
of God, whan paraventure I schal han chaungid the thingis that
he knoweth byforn,' thanne schal I answeren the thus:
'Certes thou maist wel chaungen thi purpos; but for as
mochil as the present sothnesse of the devyne purveaunce
byholdeth that thou maist chaunge thi purpos, and whethir thou
wolt chaunge it or no, and whider-ward that thou torne it, thou
ne
maist nat eschuen the devyne prescience, ryght as
thou ne maist nat fleen the sighte of the present eye, althoghe
that thou torne thiself by thi fre wil into diverse
acciouns.' But thou maist sein ayein: 'How
schal it thanne be — schal nat the devyne science ben
chaunged by
my disposicioun whan that I wol o thing now and now anothir? And
thilke prescience — ne semeth it nat to entrechaunge stoundis
of
knowynge?'" (As who seith, ne schal it nat seme to
us that the devyne prescience entrechaungith hise diverse
stoundes of knowynge, so that it knowe somtyme o thing, and
somtyme the contrarie?)
"No, forsothe," quod she, "for the devyne sighte
renneth toforn and seeth alle futures, and clepith hem ayen and
retorneth hem to the presence of his propre knowynge; ne he ne
entrechaungith nat, so as thou wenest, the stoundes of
foreknowynge, as now this, now that; but he ay duellynge cometh
byforn, and enbraseth at o strook alle thi mutaciouns. And this
presence to comprehenden and to seen alle thingis — God ne
hath
nat taken it of the bytidynge of thinges to come, but of his
propre symplicite. And herby is assoiled thilke thing that thou
puttest a litel herebyforn; that is to seyn, that it is unworthy
thing to seyn that our futures yeven cause of the science of God.
For certis this strengthe of the devyne science, whiche that
embraseth alle thinges by his presentarie knowynge, establissheth
man to alle thinges, and it ne oweth nawht to lattere thinges.
"And syn that thise thinges ben thus (that is to seyn,
syn
that necessite nis nat in thinges by the devyne
prescience), thanne is ther fredom of arbitrie, that duelleth hool and
unwemmed to mortal men; ne the lawes ne purposen nat wikkidly
medes and peynes to the willynges of men that ben unbownden and
quyt of alle necessite; and God, byholdere and forwytere of alle
thingis, duelleth above, and the present eternite of his sighte
renneth alwey with the diverse qualite of our dedes, dispensynge
and ordeynynge medes to gode men and tormentz to wikkide men. Ne
in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther put in God hope and preyeris that
ne mowen nat ben unspedful ne withouten effect whan they been
ryghtful.
"Withstond thanne and eschue thou vices; worschipe and
love thou vertues; areise thi corage to ryghtful hopes; yilde
thou humble preieres an heyhe. Gret necessite of prowesse and
vertu is encharged and comaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat
dissimulen; syn that ye worken and don (that is to
seyn, your dedes or your werkes) byforn the eyen of the juge
that seeth and demeth alle thinges."
Explicit liber Boecii.
